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SUMMARY 
HIDDEN AND REPRESSED INFLATION IN SOVIET-TYPE ECONOMIES: 
DEFINITIONS, MEASUREMENTS AND STABILISATION 
Domenico Mario Nuti, 
European University Institute, 
Florence (Italy) 
In Soviet-type economies inflationary pressures, often reduced 
but not eliminated by central planning, take the form not only _of open 
officially recorded inflation but also of hidden inflation (i.e. a 
differential between official price indices and the actual cost of living 
to consumers) and of repressed inflation (i.e. rising excess demand for 
goods and services at the actual prices in the state and non-state 
sectors). 
This paper reviews inflationary trends, the persistence of 
inflationary pressure under central planning and definitional problems 
for alternative types of inflation. Estimates of hidden inflation in 
recent literature are reviewed and generally found to understate the 
price differential in the controlled and uncontrolled markets. The wide 
divergence between recent estimates of repressed inflation, ranging between 
near-equilibrium and catastrophic imbalance, is then discussed. By and 
large excess money holdings in the economy as a whole (i.e. with reference 
to the two-tier market for consumption goods) ar.e found to be small, but 
this is seen as consistent with large-scale imbalance in the state sector. 
A model is presented illustrating the complexity and time profile 
of repressed inflation definitions and measurements, due to the difference 
between the price level which would preserve equilibrium if it had been 
prevailing for a sufficiently long period, and the price levels (depending 
on the speed of adjustment) and their time paths which can restore market 
clearing at single prices starting from a two-tier market in a state of 
imbalance. Alternative stabilisation paths and their combination are also 
investigated, using as policy instruments the price level, a liquid wealth 
tax (or currency conversion) and supply improvements. The costs of hidden 
and repressed inflation are discussed and found to be greater than the 
cost of open inflation. In sum, the task of stabilisation in Soviet-type 
economies is seen as large-scale, time-consuming and ·complex, and its 
implementation imperative. 
HIDDEN AND REPRESSED INFLATION IN SOVIET-TYPE ECONOMIES: 
DEFINITIONS, MEASUREMENTS AND STABILISATION * 
1. Introduction 
D.M. Nuti 
European University Institute, 
Florence. 
Official price trends in the USSR and in Soviet-type economies have 
changed markedly through time but have followed a roughly uniform general 
pattern: hyperinflation at times of war, systemic transition and recon-
struction; inflation at times uf accelerated industrialisation; stabili-
sation through currency reform and fiscal measures, followed by modest 
deflation and a record of substantial price stability, recently broken by 
the spreading with fewer and fewer exceptions - of renewed open inflation. 
This general pattern is due to fairly uniform trends in both policy stances 
and objective conditions: in theory central planning of both physical and 
financial flows should enable Soviet-type economies to achieve price 
stability; in practice the persistence of downward rigidity of money 
wages, the ambitious growth and accumulation targets, as well as adverse 
exogenous and systemic factors, have frequently necessitated planned or 
unplanned price increases. 
* Paper presented at the Ill World Congress for Soviet and East European 
Studies, Washington DC, 30 October - 4 November 1985. An earlier draft 
was presented at the AISSEC Conference (Turin, 25-26 October 1984), the 
EUI Working Group on Comparative Economic Systems, (Florence, 22 November 
1984) and the Department of Economics of Warsaw University (19 April 1985); 
acknowledgements are due to participants in these events for useful 
comments. This research is part of an EC funded project on "East-West 
Trade and Financial Relations in the 1980s", conducted by the author at 
the E.U .I. 
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What is particularly striking, however, is not the frequent departure 
of Soviet-type economies from price stability, since by and large their price 
record has been comparatively creditable and often even impressive, but 
the persistence of unsatisfied demand at the official prices (especially 
but not only for consumer goods) regardless of whether these prices were 
being kept stable, or falling, or rising at slow, fast or very fast rates. 
Market clearing at official prices has been a rare and short-lived 
phenomenon in the economic life of socialist countries, where shortage of 
both production and consumption goods has been the norm (Kornai, 1980), 
while access to goods and services at the official prices has been the 
privilege of priority sectors and elite groups. Shortages have taken one 
or more of the following forms: long searches; queues and waiting lists 
(including sometimes queues to join waiting lists and waiting lists to 
join queues); transactions at prices higher than official norms even in 
state shops (sometimes disguised by nominal changes in product or labels) 
but more often in alternative black, grey and multicoloured markets; 
forced substitution of available for unavailable·goods; inventories below 
norm held by distributors and above norm by consumers; extensive holdings 
and use of foreign exchange;excess liquidity; rationing; barter (which 
through effective demonetisation suggests the existence of hyperinflationary 
excess demand). The difference between countries and between periods 
has been one of degree,. ranging from market near-clearing at stable and 
even falling prices in the early 1950s almost throughout the area after 
the tough measures of post-war stabilisation, to the simultaneous and 
dramatic occurrence of shortages in all the guises listed above together 
with high official open inflation in post-1980 Poland. 
These manifestations of shortage, i.e. excess demand at official 
prices, are often discussed in Western literature under the heading of 
"hidden" and "re.pressed" .;nflat.;on. I E E h ~ ~ n astern urope t ey are rarely 
discussed, mostly in Hungarian literature as "shortage" (Kornai, 1980, 
1982) and in Polish literature (e.g. Herer-Sadowski, 1981), including 
official documents (Raport, 1981), as "inflationary gap" (luka) 
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between the value of available goods and intended purchases out of 
income, and inflationary "overhang" (nawis, or the cumulated gaps over 
time). This terminology requires two important qualifications. First, 
current usage in the literature has been inconsistent but it seems 
useful and appropriate to define in general "unofficial inflation" or 
more precisely "inflation other than open official", as including 
both "hidden" open inflation, i.e. higher price indices than officially 
recorded and "repressed inflation", i.e. rising excess liquid balances 
in the hands of the population with repect to what they would wish to 
hold if markets cleared at official prices (see below, section 4 on 
definitions). Second, concepts of hidden inflation require the presence 
not just of shortage but of increasing shortage over time (i.e. increasing 
excess demand); if excess demand was constant a once-and-for-all increase 
in official price would be sufficient to eliminate it, and we would not 
call "inflation" a once-and-for-all price rise (Portes, 1977; though there 
is inconsistency in usage, even by the same author in the same year, see 
Portes-Winter, 1977, who define repressed inflation as "the existence of 
excess demand in the consumption goods market" p. 352). Thus endemic 
and large shortages at official prices are consistent with falling rates 
of hidden and repressed inflation (if shortages are increasing at a 
decreasing rate) or even negative rates (if shortages, though large, are 
falling). 
This paper deals primarily with hidden and repressed inflation in 
the consumption goods market; it will consider inflationary pressure in 
general (whether or not it takes the form of open official inflation) 
with special reference to system-specific sources (section 2); discuss 
briefly the Soviet and Eastern European record of open official inflation 
(section 3); propose a set of definitions for alternative forms of 
unofficial inflation (section 4); review critically a number of existing 
estimates of "hidden" (section 5) and "repressed" inflation (section 6); 
sketch an alternative model for analysing repressed inflation (section 
7) and draw policy implications relevant for the possible paths towards 
stabilisation (section 8), desirable in view of the costs of unofficial 
- 4-
inflation (section 9). The main propositions of the paper are summarized 
in section 10. 
2. Inflationary pressure in the socialist economy 
The Soviet-type socialist economy is a monetarist paradise where 
the quantity theory of money applies in its strictest traditional form, 
but where there is no scope for monetary policy because the quantity of 
money is automatically adjusted by monetary authorities to planned 
physical f,lows (given planned prices) and to the degree of their actual 
implementation (see Lavlan, 1973; Garvy, 1977; Zwass, 1979; Portes, 1981a). 
There are two monetary circuits, separate in principle and to a broad extent 
also in practice. The first consists of cash and cash-convertible accounts 
for the payment of incomes to households (wages, salaries, scholarships, 
pensions, state purchases from the private sector; liquid assets of the 
population) who use them for their purchases primarily of consumption 
goods and services (and also of some physical and financial assets) from 
the state sector, as· well as for all transactions within the private 
sector. The second monetary circuit consists of bank-money which enter-
prises can use for transactions within the state sector-but not for the 
payment of personal incomes. The separation of the two circuits, and 
the planners' a priori. attempts at balancing incomes and expenditures of 
the population through wages policy and control (Adam, 1979) is the 
foundation of the traditional claim that inflation can be eliminated 
under socialism. The instruments for the a priori balancing of incomes 
and expenditures, however, are fiscal instruments and direct controls of 
wages and of consumption supply; if institutional or physical constraints 
in the use of these instruments leave an extant inflationary gap the 
planners have only one instrument of domestic monetary policy, namely 
the net sale of financial assets to the population 1 , which is however 
blunted by the traditional ideological resistence to the payment of 
attractive enough interest rates for fear of creating a new rentier 
class. Hence the justification for the neglect of monetary policy (as 
distinct from the behaviour of some monetary aggregates such as money 
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incomes and cash balances of the population) in the analysis of inflat-
ionary pressure in the Soviet-type economy (on Soviet-type banking and 
credit see also: Podolski, 1972; Lavlan, 1973). 
Since the last war, in Soviet and East-European countries price 
stability has been such a major policy commitment that traditionally 
victory over inflation is regarded as a systemic feature of socialism 
and one of its claims to superiority over the capitalist system. For 
instance Kronrod (1960) claims that "inflation has been eliminated in 
a socialist society" (p. 364); Dudinsky (1976) lists lack of inflation 
as one of the features of socialism (together with full employment, steady 
economic growth, confidence in the future and social justice) which are 
most attractive to workers in capitalist countries. Glushkov (1983) 
claims that "in the developed socialist society" ••• "prices are planned 
in accordance to the demands of objective economic laws. Planned 
production and unplanned prices in the market would be incompatible with 
one another. Stability of the system of prices is assured by the unified 
and centralised plan for economic development" (p. 24). Similar claims 
abound. There have been times, however, when open inflation has been 
the planned instrument for expropriating the private sector or financing 
investment and defence, or the unplanned result of below-plan economic 
performance (see next section). 
As in the case of capitalist countries, the source of inflationary 
pressure in Soviet-type economies is to be found in cost factors or in 
the shortfall of supply with respect to demand, except that these 
factors i) exercise a direct influence on market imbalance and neither 
affect nor are affected by monetary policy; and ii) are influenced by 
the specific systemic features of the Soviet-type economy. 
On the supply side, inflationary pressure can arise from rising costs 
or from quantity shortfalls. Rising costs may be due to the exhaustion of 
accessible natural resources, wage growth outstripping labour productivity 
growth, or imported inflation. Quantity shortfalls arise from: i) the 
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systematic underplanning (except for the present decade) and underful-
filling of the production of consumption goods and services, built into 
the traditional principles of Soviet planning, of priority to heavy 
industry (or also to the so-called A-sector producing means of production, 
as opposed to the B-sector of consumption goods); ii) the failure to 
recognise the existence of downward trends in both labour and capital 
productivity growth (including occasional negative growth) which have 
been recorded in Soviet-type systems since the mid-1960s, and which are 
associated partly ,with the rising costs caused by exhaustion of labour 
and natural resources reserves, partly with the failure to adjus·t the 
centralised,. allocation system to these changed circumstances; iii) slow 
growth of agricultural production due to system-specific neglect of 
investment in agriculture and the adoption of organisational forms (large 
state and collective farms) which are ill suited to a spatially-diffused 
and effort-responsive economic activity such as agriculture. These 
adverse systemic supply factors are sometimes made worse by random 
supply shocks such as adverse terms of trade (e.g. those experienced by 
East European countries over the last decade, with the exception of the 
oil-exporting USSR), world recession depressing export below plans; 
natural conditions (draught or flood, heat or frost) affecting especially 
agriculture, building and transport. 
On the demand side! inflationary systemic factors include: i) pressure 
on wage rates (under the guise of job classification, career structure, and 
other discretionary decisions of enterprises causing wage drift) because of 
full employment of labour, through high labour turnover and informal plant 
bargaining; ii) over-ambitious investment plans exceeding the absorption 
capacity of the economy (i.e. its ability to finance, install, operate all 
the new plant and to import necessary inputs, sometimes investment plans 
at the lower operational levels adding up to more than the overall 
centrally planned investment target, and also being systematically over-
fulfilled); iii) the increasing demands of all other items of expenditures 
(which like investment might crowd out private consumption), such as public 
consumption and defence. 
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Cost-push pressures can and frequently have been absorbed in Soviet-
type economies by means of subsidies from the state budget, ei·ther boosting 
the revenue side of enterprise accounts with subsidies on the goods produced 
or distributed (e.g. foodstuffs) or relieving the expenditure side of enter-
prise accounts with grants for investments or other costs. A typical 
instrument of price stability in this respect is the "price equalisation" 
subsidy (or tax, in the case of deflationary trends; see Wolf, 1980) for 
imported commodities, absorbing into the state budget the effects of 
imported inflation; Wiles (1973, 1974) advocated its introduction as an 
anti-inflationary measure in Western countries. All these subsidies, 
however, do not eliminate inflationary pressure but simply transform a 
cost-push into a demand-pull; to avoid inflation the subsidy component 
of the state budget will raise the government borrowing requirement 
or crowd out alternative items of expenditure. Thus subsidies can be a 
convenient instrument of inflationary control when cost-push pressures 
are of a cyclical nature, but are ill-suited to deal with permanent 
shifts (for instance in terms of trade) and even less with sustained 
trends (such as rising c~sts of natural resources, especially in the 
USSR). 
The appearance of a shortfall of supply with respect to demand at 
constant prices - whether due to demand or supply factors, or the trans-
formation of cost-push into demand-pull through state subsidies; whether 
planned or unplanned - leaves the planners with a very narrow range of 
choices: additional external finance, and/or inventory falls below normal 
levels and/or open inflation, recorded or unrecorded, in state sales or 
in secondary markets and/or additional cash holdings in the hands of the 
population over and above what would be held if markets cleared at official 
prices. 
3. Open official inflation in the USSR and Eastern Europe 
Open official inflation in the USSR and the Eastern European 
countries has occurred at hyperinflationary rates at times of war and 
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reconstruction, especially during the transition to the new system, and 
at lower but still high rates at times of accelerated industrialisation. 
For instance in the USSR the official price index, which had risen from 
100 in June 1914 to 630 in November 1917, had risen to 6,200 in July 
1918, 60,500 in July 1919, 129,000 in July 1920 and 1,290,000 in January 
1921 (Pindak, 1983). This was partly due to the destruction of productive 
capacity and transport, partly the result of a deliberate monetary policy 
- theorized among others by Preobrazhensky - aimed (especially during 
war communism 1918-1921) at gaining state access to real resources, 
protecting the workers from inflation (whose full blast was felt by the 
bourgeoisie and the kulaks) through higher wages which fuelled further 
inflation, and abolishing money through demonetisation of the economy. 
The New Economic Policy (1921-28) restored a measure of price stability 
through conventional fiscal and monetary policies, but a further infla-
tionary wave was brought about by accelerated industrialisation and the 
need to finance it in spite of downward rigidity of money wages, as well 
as by collectivisation of agriculture (through its adverse impact on 
agricultural output) and full employment of labour (which caused high 
labour turnover and wage drift). Table 1 indicates retail price indices 
from official sources and Western reconstructions for the period 1928-47, 
at a yearly rate of the order of 17-21 per cent vis-a-vis a parallel 
increase of 12.8 per cent in average nominal wages (the implied trend 
in real wages grossly underestimating average standard of living growth 
due to the parallel growth of wage labour employment during the period 
at a rate faster than population growth), wholesale prices of basic 
industrial goods remaining much more stable thanks to state cross 
subsidies from consumption to production goods, to supplement the revenue 
of enterprises producing production goods. 1947 was an anomalous year, 
with peak prices and a monetary reform aimed at confiscating much of the 
purchasing power of the population through a change of the currency that 
converted prices, wages, savings and cash at rates diversified so as to
2 favour wages and saving deposits with respect to cash (Holzman, 1955). 
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The East European countries that joined the socialist bloc after the 
last War experienced a similar pattern: inflation at a fast and occasionally 
hyperinflationary rate during the period of transition to the new system 
and reconstruction and the early stages of Soviet-type ambitious investment 
policy (for instance, retail prices in Poland increased by 62.4% between 
1946 and 1949, and again by 78.5% in 1950-53; in Czechoslovakia by about 
64% between 1948 and 1953; the GDR experienced early hyperinflation), 
followed by monetary stabilisation mainly through Soviet-type currency 
conversion at diversified and progressive rates. In Poland in 1950 all 
prices, wages and saving deposits were converted at a rate of 3 new to 
lOO old zlotys, while cash was converted at a 1 to 100 rate, thus confis-
cating two thirds of the cash in the hands of the population (see Montias, 
1962, p. 69-70). In 1952 in Romania and Bulgaria cash holdings were 
reduced to one fifth and one fourth respectively of their previous value; 
conversion rates were progressively unfavourable with respect to the amount 
converted 3 ; a similar reform took place in Czechoslovakia in 1953 (see 
ECE-UN, 1953, p. 32). 
There followed, throughout the area, three distinct periods (see 
Table 2), a period of falling prices from the time of stabilisation 
roughly to the late '50s; a period of remarkable price stability until 
after the first oil shock and often well beyond it into the late '70s 
(thanks to the delayed impact of oil price rises within CMEA trade, the 
initial absorption of imported inflation through state budget subsidies, 
and the rise of external borrowing); and a period of open inflation, 
fuelled by the gradual diffusion of oil price rises, the mounting cost 
of price subsidies, the slowdown and occasional fall of external finance 
and the rising pressure of wages. This tendency has become much clearer 
in the last couple of years, but (see Table 3) has not reached two digit 
rates with the exception of Romania in 1982 and Poland in 1980 to date 
(primarily due to the accelerated growth of money wages in conditions 
of falling labour productivity, the external credit squeeze and its 
negative cascade effects on supplies through the curtailment of essential 
imports, the excessive weight of over-ambitious investment plans ineffect-
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ively executed, as well as exogenous factors; see Nuti, 1981, 1982). By 
1983, when major price increases have been recorded even in Bulgaria, 
though their impact is still not officially assessed, the GDR is the 
only East European country that can claim an uninterrupted quarter 
century spell of price stability. 
4. Definitions: unofficial, hidden and repressed inflation 
Inflationary pressure which does not take the form of open official 
inflation-(including official open inflation in the collective farm market) 
can express itself through the market in the form of open non-official 
(unrecorded) and therefore hidden inflation and/or be repressed and 
remain at the purely potential state of unused liquid assets in the 
hands of the population over and above their desired level. Both types 
of inflation are "hidden" until they are reconstructed from the inconsis-
tencies of official records, fragmentary direct observations and indirect 
evidence. 
Unrecorded - and therefore unofficial - open but hidden inflation 
can occur for three different reasons. First, because of price rises 
above the official level, either in state shops or in private markets. 
Official price lists m~y lag behind actual prices charged by retailing 
organisations within their discretionary powers (e.g. for new products, 
including pseudo-novelties). Quality may deteriorate at constant prices. 
State goods may be sold at prices higher than state prices by dishonest 
retailers charging a premium to customers or by buyers reselling in a 
private market; private producers may supply additional consumption 
goods and services also at a price higher than the official price (of 
course profits from private production or redistribution should then be 
included on the income side of household accounts). When these price 
premia appear or rise, actual open inflation is higher than officially 
recorded. 
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Second, unrecorded open inflation can arise from quantity weights in 
official price indices understating the relative weights of goods whose 
actual market prices (whether or not equal to the official price) rise 
relatively faster. In principle quantity weights different from those 
appropriate to actual prices could lead to a price index bias either 
way, but systematic official understating is the likely result of cosmetic 
data manipulation by the authorities, information lags and higher than 
official price rises. Third, unrecorded open inflation can arise from 
progressive forced substitution by consumers of goods which are available 
at their official price for goods which are not available; usually higher 
priced substitutes replace cheaper (often subsidised) goods. The use of 
actual quantity weights instead of dubious and conveniently changing 
official baskets captures both the possible understating of inflation 
with respect to equilibrium weights and the inflationary effect of 
forced substitution over time (though not the loss of consumer surplus 
involved in the limited access to shortage goods, implicit in forced 
substitution). As Nove puts it, "In~ system, when price controls exist 
and the product mix can be varied, the price index will always understate 
price rises ••• " (198la, p. 145). 
If, directly or indirectly, a price index is constructed reflecting 
actual prices and actual (Laspeyres or Paasche) quantity weights, the 
actual open inflation rate p can be decomposed into its recorded and 
unrecorded components, respectively pr and pu' given the relationship 
(l+p)=(l+pr)(l+pu). Rates of unrecorded open inflation calculated for 
each period putting the previous period's index equal to lOO are cumula-
tive over time, but unrecorded open inflation is not "repressed" in any 
conceivable sense, as it is an effective outlet for inflationary pressure, 
and therefore is not cumulative in the sense of contributing to infla-
tionary pressure in the following period through accumulated pent-up 
demand, as in the case of excess liquid assets of the population 
(inflationary gap and overhang). 
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Repressed inflation is rising excess demand which does not take 
the form of higher prices but remains in the hands of the population as 
d · d 1 1 Thus its definition and excess liquid assets over their es~re eve • 
measurement requires the prior definition and measurement of "desired" 
In a tr;vial sense all liquid assets could be considered liquid assets. ..._ _ 
as desired because asset holders can always convert any surplus holdings 
into any good in the free (legal or black) market or into non-shortage 
k Therefore ;n the strictest sense there goods in the official mar et. ..._ 
could be "excess" asset holdings only for inflexibly law-abiding citizens 
with zero storage facilities, or for people deterred from transacting in 
the markets· to the full extent of their intended purchases because of 
particularly high transaction costs (in the state market because of 
· · · the free market because of legal abortive searches, queues, wa~t~ng; ~n 
and moral restraints, its thinness and inconvenience). Otherwise liquid 
asset holders will have expressed effective demand up to the point where 
the marginal utility of current purchases of higher-priced goods in the 
free market or ·of forced substitution goods in the state market is equal 
to the discounted marginal utility of future prospective purchases of goods 
at official prices (weighed by the probability of their future availability) 
f dd"t" 1 1 ·sure at the going wage (at or at expected free prices, or o a ~ ~ona e~ 
least within the period obtainable through voluntary unemployment in between 
jobs). By and large, any intended purchasing power which cannot satisfy 
itself in the state market will push up prices in the free (legal and 
black) market where goods purchased from the state market are retraded 
and newly produced goods from the private sectors may be sold, up to the 
point where demand for liquid assets for transaction and speculation 
purposes is raised to the level of existing liquid assets; barring 
extreme hyperinflationary situations where the economy is effectively 
demonetised, monetary equilibrium in the economy as a whole will be 
reached or (within the limits set by high transaction costs) approached. 
Nevertheless, a significant part, if not all, of liquid assets held by 
the population in a situation of imbalance in the state market at 
· · h t to the assets which the official prices will be excess~ve w~t respec 
h h ld ;f it could convert them into goods in population would wis to o .... _ 
that market at those prices. 
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Government internal and external borrowing can ease inflationary 
pressure but the size (and growth) of debt cannot be properly-included 
in excess demand (and repressed inflation), except for the component of 
debt (and its growth) on which the government may have defaulted. 
Once excess demand in the state sector at official prices rises above 
a critical threshold, repressed inflation steps in; open inflation in free 
markets can lead to overall monetary equilibrium in the economy as a whole 
but this is consistent with persistent disequilibrium in the state sector. 
In fact the entire excess of liquid assets over the level which would be 
desired at the given state price level if the state market had been 
clearing for a long time, plus the liquid assets which the population -
having experienced market imbalance instead - would wish to convert 
speculatively into goods if supply suddenly became infinitely elastic at 
state prices, at any moment of time is pressing on the state market 
backing intended purchases with the necessary spending power. Moreover, 
any unsatisfied demand (overhang) existing at the beginning of a period 
plus any inflationary gap (intended purchases out of disposable income 
not matched by goods at official prices) will be carried over into the 
next period; a sequence of small gaps therefore can cumulate over time 
to a serious overall level of excess demand. While it is correct to 
define as repressed inflation, strictly speaking, only the growth rate 
of this excess demand, past repressed inflation is cumulatively pressing 
in current markets and would have to be added to current open inflation 
in its cumulative entirety if it were to be transformed into open 
inflation (its additional contribution to open inflation of course 
depending on the length of the period over which it was made open). A 
zero or negative current rate of repressed inflation is therefore 
consistent with the possibility of massive current imbalance in the 
state market, which would require an injection of goods, or a tax on 
liquid assets or a higher rate of open inflation than would otherwise be 
the case, at rates inversely proportional to the period of time over 
which the stabilisation is attempted. 
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between unofficial/unrecorded inflation, plus There is a connection 
recorded l·nflation in non-state markets (such as kolkhozian officially 
· N 1 ·f the sum of the first two markets), and repressed inflat1on. ame y, 1 
zero (or small), it can be conjectured that the types of inflation is 
d d h not grown (much) relatively to monetary magnitude of excess eman as 
11 b 1 and - following money income; however excess demand can sti e arge, 
_ 1·t will have grown approximately as fast as money this line of argument 
income. 
5. Estimates of hidden inflation 
Three basic methods have been used to estimate inflation rates over 
and above official levels (including official inflation in recorded legal 
markets): the direct computation of price indices from available information 
about quantities and·prices of individual categories of goods; the 
fl ;~pll.cit in indices of monetary and real calculation of de ators ~· 
Parity approach to black market exchange magnitudes; the purchasing power 
rates. 
Western 
early 1960s: 
· th · own price series in the economists started recomput1ng e1r 
Michal (1960) for Czechoslovakia, Nutter (1962) and Chapman 
(1963) for the Soviet Union. Michal, for instance, found that retail 
prices rose in Czechoslovakia by about 64 per cent between 1948 and mid-
1953, instead of the officially reported stability depicted in Table 2; 
Chapman's estimates for Soviet retail prices in 1928-47 diverge less from 
official indices but are also higher than them (except for 1941-47 due to 
non-comparability of periods; see Table 1). The long duration of the price 
ml.d-1950s somewhat lessened interest in indepen-stability achieved in the 
dent computations of this kind. When the reliability of official statistics 
h P 1 . h under-recording began to be suspect again, after incidents sue as o 1s 
· f · es for challenging of the 1970 price increases and similar pr1ma ac1e cas 
and lack of data led Western economists to use official data, convenience 
indirect methods. 
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It is well known that dividing an index of expenditure at current 
prices by a Laspeyres quantity index one obtains an implicit Paasche price 
index. Howard (1976) used real consumption estimates independently con-
structed by Bronson and Severin (1973) and current consumption expenditure 
indices to calculate lower and upper limits for Soviet state retail and 
general consumer "true" or "actual" price indices. The lower limit is 
calculated by assuming that there was no hidden inflation in the food 
sector; the higher limit by assuming that the hidden inflation in food 
is equal to that in durables and "soft" goods (see Table 4). Howard found 
"true" price indices substantially but not devastatingly higher than the 
official indices, "true" inflation still being contained within 0. 8 - 1. 2 
per cent per annum in 1955-72; Howard also found that state and cooperative 
retail sales have not increased as much as suggested by official indices 
over the period. 
Reward's approach was severely criticised by Rosefielde (1980) and 
further debated by the two authors (Howard, 1981; Rosefielde, 1981a). The 
main point of the debate is the legitimacy of using, for the calculation 
of an implicit deflator, a quantity index which does not embody the same 
weights used to construct the monetary expenditure index, and therefore the 
reliability of Howard's estimates. Admittedly the "true" price index calcu-
lated by Howard is, as Rose·fielde contends, a quantity/price "hybrid"; it 
remains to be shown, however, that the use of more accurate weights would 
yield drastically different results. As a "rough estimate", in Howard's 
words, the "true" price index provides an interesting check to the hypo-
thesis of a close-to-true Soviet official index. (Similar rates were com-
puted by Schroeder and Severin, 1976, at the yearly rate of 1.3 per cent 
in 1955-1975). 
The same line of reasoning followed by Howard is implicit in Portes 
(1977), who compared directly average increases in money wages (which nobody 
ever suggested are under-recorded) and real consumption (which he takes 
from official data, regarded as reliable) in order to obtain indirect 
confirmation of the thesis that officially recorded inflation was by and 
large correct in the 1955-75 period. Alton et al. (1979) used their own 
independent estimates of real consumption growth for the CMEA Six to 
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establish the "true" inflation rates for 1970-78, which are substantially 
higher (though still modest by Western standards and in the one-digit 
range) than official rates except for Hungary (see Table 5; for a dis-
cussion of Alton's results see also Kohn, 1980). Presumably Rosefielde's 
objection to Howard applies with the same strength to Alton's estimates. 
If the purpose of the "true" indices was that of assessing the truthful-
ness and efficiency of statistical offices in recording prices and relative 
quantities of all goods leaving the state shops and all those exchanged in 
the official non-state sector, then the use of own recalculations or implicit 
deflators could be good enough. But for discussing hidden and repressed infla-
tionary processes, however, these indices have a major defect. A "true" price 
index in fact ought to record ideally the price actually paid by ultimate users, 
both for goods originally purchased in state shops and for goods which private 
producers might supply. At the same time, "true" income indices ought to inc-
lude the total increment that the value of state goods acquire in the (legal 
or illegal) process of redistribution, and the total value added in private 
4 production, so as to make price and income indices mutually consistent 
The existence of a two-tier market, consisting of controlled and 
(legal and illegal) free segments (see Katsenelinboigen, 1977; Morton, 1980; 
Bauer, 1983), is fully recognised and modelled in the literature on the 
"second economy" (e.g. G. Grossman, 1977, 1985; O'Hearn, 1980) but is 
not fully modelled and measured in the literature on unofficial inflation, 
where the dominant model is that (exemplified by Barro-Grossman H., 1974) 
of the "rationed" quantity-constrained consumer (and firm) and the measure-
ment of market phenomena excludes both the private retrading of state goods 
and non-state production outside the collective farm sector (which is 
played down anyway in view of its small relative weight in total consumption 
expenditure, e.g. by Portes, 1979, p. 329). Yet consumers in Soviet-type 
economies are not at all technically "rationed" in their overall budget 
constraint; they are only "rationed" (whether through coupons or at random) 
in their purchases from state.shops at official prices. Their position is 
that of a consumer facing a two-part tariff with a high marginal price, and 
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with an option on purchases at the lower price of the first part of his 
tariff - an option which however is not being honoured and which he 
relentlessly seeks to realise ready to switch all his higher part tariff 
expenditure and buy more if he only could at any time. Such a consumer 
would not be regarded as quantity rationed, nor should the consumer in 
Soviet-type economies. The thinness of the free (legal and illegal) 
market where state goods are retraded and non-state goods are sold - if 
that market is thin - makes its quantitative impact on hidden inflation 
small, but the very fact that consumers can, if they wish, convert liquid 
assets into goods and services in free markets has a major implication also 
for the definition and measuring of repressed inflation, because the 
opportunity of transacting in secondary and primary non-state markets 
naturally makes all liquid assets "desired" except for the amount left 
unconverted because of the high cost of transactions (including sanctions 
on the part of those transactions that are treated as illegal) in those 
markets. 
Culberston and Amacher (1972) apply the purchasing power parity theory 
of exchange rates to black markets for foreign exchange in CMEA countries 
and estimate actual inflation rates by comparing changes in the black rate 
of the US dollar - regarded as an equilibrium rate - with trends in the US 
consumer price index. Any depreciation of the national currency vis-a-vis 
the US dollar is attributed to differential inflation with respect to 
the US. Their estimates are summarised in Table .6; like the other estimates 
reviewed here, actual inflation is estimated at a substantially higher 
but still one-digit level. If it worked, this method of indirect estimate 
of actual inflation rates would reflect trends in the marginal cost to 
consumers of acquiring goods in free markets, i.e. the inflation rate in 
those markets rather than in the average cost of living. This method, 
however, is subject not only to the customary reservations applicable 
to the purchasing power parity approach to market economies (the neglect 
of capital flows, the choice of weights, the use of average instead of 
marginal concepts, etc.) but also to system-specific reservations: i) no 
black market price in a two-tier black/white market can be regarded as 
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an equilibrium price; it is usually higher than the equilibrium price 
but not necessarily by the same proportion at different times; ii) black 
market rates are affected by a number of variable demand and supply 
factors which have nothing to do with underlying trends in hidden 
inflation, such as remittances from abroad, degree of foreign tourist 
surveillance, toughness of penalties, foreign travel opportunities, 
official attitude towards emigration, etc.; iii) black market rates have 
a floor below which the will not fall, given by the ratio between the 
domestic price of goods (like vodka and cigarettes) widely consumed and 
with semi-monetary qualities in personal exchange, and their $ price in 
special state shops (Beriozka, Pewex, Cedok, etc.) for sales in hard 
currencies. Thus if the dollar price of a bottle of vodka in a Pewex 
shop is $1 and its zloty price in ordinary shops is zl. 700, the black 
market rate for the US$ will not fall substantially below zl. 700. Thus 
trends in black market exchange rates reflect the vodka puchasing power 
parity in domestic ordinary and special state shops, or the equivalent 
rate for other goods supplied in both kinds of shop at more advantageous 
rates if supplied and demanded in sufficiently high quantities to make 
them the marginal rate, rather than any comparison of generalised 
purchasing power parity. Vanous (1984) suggests the same approach with 
reference to the DM, but the same reservations apply; since arbitrage in 
black markets for foreign currency is far from perfect, cross rates and 
therefore inflation estimates will differ with the hard currency actually 
used in the comparisons. 
A more interesting and imaginative use of purchasing power parities, 
which does not lend itself to the criticisms raised here, is made by 
Askanas and Laski (1985) who, starting from a bilateral comparison of 
consumption levels in Poland and Austria in 1964, 1973 and 1978 (estimated 
by the Central Statistical Offices of the two countries in the currencies 
of either country) calculate the implicit price indices for both countries. 
They find that implicit indices differ from official statistics and infer 
that over the period considered either Austrian actual inflation has been 
over-recorded and has taken place at 3.0 per cent per year instead of the 
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official 5.3 per cent, or Polish actual inflation has been at 5.2 per 
cent instead of the official under-recorded 2.9 per cent. Since this 
kind of problem does not arise in similar comparisons among Western 
countries, and the authors have no reason to believe that Austrian 
inflation - lowest among market economies in Europe - has been over-
valued, they conclude that Polish inflation has been 5.2 instead of 
2.9 per cent over the period. 
In general, there is an "informal consensus of experts" that "official 
inflation statistics are most reliable for Hungary, followed by Czechos-
lovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania" (Vanous, 1984). When 
inflation is officially understated, if this is due to actual prices in state 
markets being higher than official price lists no policy measure is required 
except official admission that prices are higher than previously claimed; a 
once-for-all uplift in official inflation (which can be substantial due to 
the cumulative effects of even small discrepancies over time) will suffice 
without altering the population's purchasing power. If official understate-
ment of inflation is due to free (black and legal) markets being under-
recorded, the case for closing the gap between the two price levels is made 
stronger. Even the total coincidence of "true" and "official" inflation rates 
does not rule out the existence of a possibly large inflationary overhang, 
already in existence at the beginning of the period for which the comparison 
is made and growing through time at the same pace as income and expenditure. 
The existence and measurement of hidden inflation outside the sphere 
of consumption goods has also been widely debated (see for instance Becker 
1974; Nove, 1981a, 1981b; Cohn, 1981; Rosefielde, 1981b, 1983; Steiner, 1982, 
1983). The question is interesting for the overall assessment of economic 
performance in Soviet-type economies, and in particular of the actual size 
and growth of investment and defence outlays. Inflationary pressures outside 
the consumption goods sector are bound to spillover into it through direct 
competition between consumers and firms for some goods and through substi-
tution processes; non-open inflation for non-consumption is likely to take 
more the form of repressed than hidden inflation, in view of greater 
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and eas~er monitoring of financial transactions between firms restrictions _,_ 
with respect to redistribitive transactions between consumers. 
6. Estimates of repressed inflation 
Visible signs of frustrated spending intentions, such as queues, 
Conclus ive evidence of repressed inflation. They are not by themselves 
spending intentions may be so totally frustrated are not necessary, because 
Worth One 's time 5 They are not sufficient, because that queueing is not 
the ~nefficiency 6 or the underprovision of distribu-queues may he due to _,_ 
1977), or to relative prices (instead of the overall tive services (Turcan, 
price index) differing from market-clearing prices (Delhaes, 1978; 
Podkaminer 7, 1983), and not necessarily to the presence of excess demand 
at official prices. Even if there are visible signs of frustrated spending 
. . can be misleading for the measurement of excess demand and 1.ntent1.ons, they 
above all of its rate of change (only which is, strictly speaking, repressed 
h ~ntended purchases, because inflation): declared demands may be greater tan_,_ 
they discount a scaling down process (just as in an expectedly over-
~n a market economy; a household may be queueing subscribed share issue _,_ 
in more than one queue for a single intended purchase); queues may get 
~mprovement rather than a worsening of the state of longer because of an _,_ 
supplies. 
· b · 1) f liquid balances in the By itself the increase (even if su stant1.a o . 
relat4vely to income or sales, is also ne1.ther hands of the population, _,_ 
as an indication of repressed inflation. necessary nor sufficient Liquid 
be accumulated because of systemic lack of access to less balances may 
liquid forms of holding wealth (land, plant, non-state bonds, shares, 
d d) inflation might require the accumula-etc.). Open (official or unrecor e 
tion of liquid assets to raise transaction balances whose real value has 
been lowered by inflation. Cash requirements relative to purchases may 
4ncreas~ng share of transactions taking place in increase because of the _,_ _,_ 
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the second economy (Grossman, 1977). A more·erratic pattern of supply, 
without any alteration in the overall balance between supply and demand, 
may raise required cash holdings, desired for speculative purposes; 
Green (1978) likens this phenomenon to "the demand for cash balances 
among New York drug addicts" - or, one might add less dramatically, among 
antique dealers everywhere. 
Nevertheless, the coexistence of visible officially recognised signs 
of frustrated spending intentions and the parallel accumulation of 
increasing substantial liquid assets relative to incomes and sales has 
been widely taken as a prima facie case for presuming excess demand and 
repressed inflation, or at any rate for considering it as a hypothesis 
worthy of testing and measurement. 
Pindak (1983) is typical of a simple and direct approach to repressed 
inflation (another instance is Cassel, 1984). First indirect evidence of 
excess demand is considered, such as the falling share of goods officially 
recognised as not experiencing "supply difficulties" (for Czechoslovakia 
in the 1970s, for instance, see Table 7); then the ratios of cash and non-
cash financial assets to other variables are regarded as indicators which 
"express the processes of repressed inflation" •••• "Even if the exact level 
of forced savings remains unclear ••.. " (p. 33). These indicators are the 
average saving propensity, the ratio between cash increments and total 
income, and especially the income velocity of financial assets (which is 
reproduced from Pindak in Table 8). However as we have just noted there 
is no systematic necessary relation between these indicators and repressed 
inflation; moreover Pindak's conclusion that "the GDR emerges as the 
country with the most virulent repressed inflation" is contrary to casual 
observation and other evidence (Flaetgen, 1985; see below). Birman (1980a) 
claims that "an overwhelming part of all savings is forced" (p. 88), talks 
of "the colossal surplus of money" and the "crisis in the circulation of 
cash" (p. 90; see also 1980b). 
Official recognition of excess monetary balances of the population 
in Soviet-type economies first came in the 1981 official report by the 
Polish government on the state of the economy (from which Table 9 is 
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taken; Raport, 1981), echoing the approach developed by Polish economists 
(for instance, Herer-Sadowski, 1981) who carefully distinguish inflationary 
gap (luka), i.e. the share of current personal incomes not covered by 
consumption goods and services at official prices, and inflationary over-
hang (nawis, or current demand out of liquid assets built out of past 
inflationary gaps and carried over from previous periods). The sum of the 
two adds up to more conventional "excess demand"; the distinction between 
the two components is notional and arbitrary, but it is useful in discussing 
time processes and trends. Without reference to additional evidence, 
however, or without the support of models and estimates of demand for 
financial asse,ts, both notions of gap and overhang are also arbitrary 
and so are their measurements. The same applies to calculations embodying 
an allowance for an arbitrarily estimated growth of desired financial 
holdings with respect to a period of market balance and tranquillity 
(Gomulka, 1979). 
The first attempt at building an index of repressed inflation is by 
Holzman (1960) who interprets the ratio between free market price (in the 
kolkhozian market) and state price for foodstuffs, weighted by the share of 
output sold in the free market, as an indicator of overall excess demand 
(which he identifies with repressed inflation); Holzman's series have been 
updated by Garvy (1977) and Dirkens (1981; see Table 10, where the value of 
the index in 1955 is made equal to 100; see also Portes, 1977, 1981b). The 
index suggests a fall in excess demand (i.e. negative repressed inflation) 
between 1955 and the early 1970s in the USSR, followed by a modest positive 
rise in the rest of the decade. The notion that, if there is excess demand 
at state prices and some of it is repressed, the amount of repressed excess 
demand will be directly related to the impact of non-repressed excess 
demand on free prices is ingenious and appealing. If this is the underlying 
rationale of Holzman's original approach, an even better indicator would be 
provided by the ratio between "true" price indices such as those discussed 
in the previous section, and official price indices in state shops (i.e. 
excluding the kolkhozian market from the official price index) because in 
that way the varying intensity of excess demand in non-food as well as food 
intended expenditure is taken into consideration. If the reasoning is 
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accepted, the constancy of the index from one year to the next indicates 
the constancy of relative excess demand wJ.·th respect to current sales, 
i.e. the growth of absolute excess demand by the same rate as sales _ which 
is convenient for preserving the possibility of multiplying indices of true 
open inflation and repressed inflation to obtain total inflation 8 . zero 
repressed inflation, however, simply means the preservation of the relative 
·excess demand existing in the base period, and "f h" J. t J.s is large it is hardly 
a consolation for the planners facing the task of markets stabilisation. 
Holzman's index, unfortunately, does not indicate the size of that excess 
demand, only its time trend. 
Kornai claims that in a "t t• f h SJ. ua J.on o ~ shortages ". • • aggregate 
excess demand is not an operational category •.• " (1980, p. 477) and proposes 
a composite "shortage index" (Kornai, 1982). Partial indicators of shortage 
are identified: the orders refused by the building industry, unfilled orders 
for cars, building materials shortage, deviation of household savings from 
the trend; a macroindex of shortage is then constructed on the basis of 
time series for the partial indicators (see Table 11 for Hungary 1965-78). 
Like Holzman's index, Kornai's macroindex indicates the dynamics of the 
phenomenon under investigation, not its absolute size at any time; also, 
it combines consumption and production goods; these appear as advantages 
from Kornai's theor t• 1 t · e J.ca s ance, sJ.nce they avoid the notion of aggregate 
excess demand and the problem of netting out positive and negative excess 
demands in different sectors, and allow for the generalised spreading of 
shortage, when it occurs, across sectors; they seem, however, drawbacks 
with respect to the observer's and the planner's task of assessing both 
performance and the difficulty of tasks ahead. M oreover, the particular 
version of macroindex constructed by Kornai - which shows shortage to be 
a cyclical phenomenon rather than a trend - may reflect the choice of 
savings deviation from trend as a partial indicator of shortage, which 
already presumes consumer shortage to be cyclical without a long-run 
trend. 
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Attempts at measuring excess demand and the implicit repressed 
inflation, as well as testing the hypothesis of its existence at the same 
time, have been developed in econometric studies, and recently have 
grown considerably with the application of disequilibrium econometrics. 
Soviet household savings were found to conform to patterns well explored 
for market economies in early attempts by Volkonskii-Solovev-Semonova 
(1976) using a Houthakker-Taylor savings function and by Pickersgill 
(1976) using the permanent income hypothesis (see also Pickersgill, 1970, 
1977, 1980). Portes and Winter (1978) provided an estimate of household 
demand for money and saving functions well tried for market economies 
(log-linear fu,nction for desired balances, with a stock-adjustment process; 
and savings functions based on the absolute income hypothesis and on the 
Houthakker-Taylor function); they reported successful estimation and found 
" ..• no evidence of abnormal behaviour that might suggest sustained disequi-
librium ••• " (p. 17). Green (1978) replicating a slightly modified version 
of the same analysis for the GDR reached similar conclusions but found that 
the attainment of equilibrium appeared to depend upon the availability of 
food sold at official retail prices, since households accumulated fewer 
financial assets when food supplies are tight in the GDR (which therefore 
indicates greater consumption disequilibrium in spite of lower savings 
when that occurs). 
In a subsequent paper Portes and Winter (1980) apply techniques of 
disequilibrium econometrics to the same problems, applying a discrete-
switching disequilibrium model with a household demand equation for 
consumption goods, a planners' supply equation and "min" condition 
stating that the actual quantity transacted is the lesser of the quantity 
demanded and supplied; they reject "the hypothesis of sustained repressed 
inflation in the market for consumption goods and services since the mid-
1950s in our four CPEs" (1980, pp. 155-156); indeed, excess supply is 
regarded as the most probable dominant regime in three out of the four 
countries (1980, p. 149). A further development of this model was based 
on the approach of Charemza and Quandt (1982) who postulated the adjust-
ment of planned quantities instead of actual prices; Portes-Quandt-Winter-
- --0--c-~~--~--~----------
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Yeo (1983) used new data about plan fulfilment to model an elaborate 
(plausible though arbitrary) objective function for socialist· planners 
which included plan response to plan fulfilment, and applied the model to 
Poland in 1955-80. Alternative models are generated, according to slightly 
different ways of defining and computing excess demand terms; average 
simulated excess demands for Poland in 1957-80 using the four best 
performing variants of the model are reproduced in Table 12. The startling 
result is the persistence of low estimates of excess demand (and of the 
average rates of repressed inflation which are implicit in them over the 
period), even for the country and the years where indirect evidence suggests 
that excess demand and repressed inflation were at their peak. Thus in 1980 
Poland simulated excess demand for the best four models ranges from a 
maximum of 1.2 per cent in two of the models to -0.1 per cent (i.e. excess 
~. though at a negligible rate). 
Charemza-Gronicki (1982, 1984) and Charemza (1984) apply the "rational" 
expectations hypothesis (pioneered by Muth, 1961) to a disequilibrium model 
a la Barro-Grossman (1976), embodying households demand for consumption and 
money and supply of labour; wages adjust to workers' expected excess demand 
and primary plans drawn on enterprises' expectations of labour shortages 
are aggregated and adjusted to labour supply by central planners. Estimated 
excess demands for consumption and labour, absolute and relative to the 
quantities transacted, are included in Table 13; rising trends can be 
observed for all variables, with a U-shaped pattern for percentage excess 
demands (with turning points in 1970 for consumption and 1971 for labour) 9 
Charemza-Gronicki also define "balancing price" pB as the price level 
which would have equated the value of actual purchases to the value of 
intended purchases at actual prices. The difference between the pB index 
and the actual price index p60 obtained by putting 1960=100 is regarded 
as a measure of excess demand (Table 14), better than that indicated in 
Table 13 in that it conveniently peaks in 1980 as direct observation 
would have suggested 10 
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There are a number of criticisms and reservations which could be raised 
against the econometric estimates of excess demand and its rates of change 
reported here, to try and reconcile the generally low estimates with the 
more widespread impressions of large scale and growing imbalance. Thus, for 
instance, the use by Portes et al. (1983) of deviations from trend in house-
holds' financial assets could be thought to rule out from the outset the 
possibility of a trend of increasing excess demand and explain the 
closeness of their results to Kornai (1982) who does the same. Labour 
supply negatively responding to market imbalance (Charemza-Gronicki, 
1984) in spite of constraints in workers' choice of working time may 
have over-estimated excess demand in the labour market and under-estimated 
it for consumption goods. Rational expectations -which many would regard 
as inappropriate to model market economies, let alone centrally planned 
ones - leaving hardly any room for the unexpected might have been crucial 
to the results reported by Charemza-Gronicki (who specificially use them) 
and Portes et al. (who approximate them in two of their model variants). 
Even without this kind of criticism, however, it is perfectly possible 
to reconcile estimates of low excess demand and repressed inflation with 
the widespread concern for market imbalance expressed by many observers and 
officials alike: consumers may be quantity rationed in their purchases from 
the state sector at state prices, but are not rationed in their purchases 
in the non-state sector where non-state goods may be supplied and state 
goods may be retraded at higher prices. Excess demand at state prices is 
channelled into the non-state sector driving prices there up to the point 
where liquid balances for transactions plus those speculatively held are 
voluntarily demanded by the population. This point is made strongly and 
persuasively by Gregory Grossman: " ••• it would seem that the very presence 
of a large second economy, and in particular of a black market, in a sense 
does away with repressed inflation, despite fairly rigid control of official 
retail prices. In the second economy, prices tend to be high enough to 
eliminate any overall 'monetary overhang' (that is, excess of purchasing 
power over the total supply of goods and services at effective prices) 
and to forestall a repressed inflationary situation in relation to the 
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controlled and non-controlled sectors taken together" (1977, in Tanzi, 1983, 
p. 259). Hartwig (1983) also stresses that involuntary real money balances 
are r~~o~e-d already in the short run: fdr their overwhelming part' "partly 
by :fnci~asing prices in thesecondeconomy, partlyby a renewed rise in the 
demand for liquid assets"; the rise in transaction costs (queueing, bribes, 
infotnlation·costs, etc.), growing informal transactions and "the desire to 
possess liquid assets in order to take advantage of unexpected opportunities 
'·cause economic agents to" ·convert involuntary into voluntary money balances" 
(Hartwig, 1983, p. 104). Brus-Laski (1983), though concurring with this 
general view,· regard the speculative element in money holdings as dependent 
on the. maintenance 00f lower state prices and therefore properly ·classified 
under excess deim:irid; this is an importanE condition for the stability of 
the free market, however, which d~es not make speculative cash holdings 
any less·vo1.untarily held. Byand large, excep't for temporary excess 
balances dueto time lags in adjusting to monetary shocks, "enormous amounts 
of involuntary liquid assets in the private ·sector seem very implausible" 11 
(Hartwig, 1983, p. ios). 
rf there is nb hidden or· open hyperinflation, and no differential 
trartisactioh co;ts in the free and the controlled market, a properly 
coristru~ted and :spe~ified ecOnometric· model sh~uld give zero excess demand 
c.a:lf tlfe time ·and therefore 'iero repressed infla~ion •. Since we know from 
direct ·evidence that there was no bid'den or open hyper-inflation in the 
perioa ahd'coun:tries considered:, estimates of positive excess demand must 
. . . 
be due to ia·ctors such as the use of price indices different from the 
ittrue";, tndices, d:ms\imer r·estraint from transacting fully on free markets 
·{out of' Party loyalty, f~ar of perialt:l.e~ or lack of storage space) and 
more generally differential transaction costs. However information costs 
and any other inconvenience in the free market cannot be much greater than 
the cost of searching and queueing in the controlled market; Party-loyal 
citizens are likely to have privileged access to goods and large storage 
space, while less .enlightened citizens are likely to be less deterred by 
penalties and to be willing to go to great lengths to realise their 
purchasing power (within the limits set by expected future prices, 
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probability of supply and time preference, as indicated in the previous 
section): excess demand in the economy as a whole is likely to be small. 
This is the good news. The bad news is that most and possibly all 
of the liquid assets in the hands of the population are pressing at any 
time onto the lower priced and quantity constrained state sector12 Intended 
purchases at state prices will be equal to the quantity which would have 
been demanded at those prices if no market imblance had been experienced 
recently, plus speculative demand 13 expressed on the reasonable expectation 
that recent market imbalance at those state prices might reoccur in the 
near future (within the constraints set by storage opportunities and by 
expectations about likely appreciation at future free prices relative 
to interest foregone plus physical depreciation and other storage costs). 
Excess demand in the state sector is equal to these intended purchases 
minus actual supplies, and this can be large and increasing fast even if 
excess demand in the economy as a whole is constantly held at zero by 
inflation in the non-state sector whether or not officially recognised. 
In the presence of this phenomenon, which has very considerabl-e economic 
costs to the economy (not to count political costs to the regime), claims 
about the absence or low incidence of excess demand sound somewhat frivolous 
and the rough and ready estimates of experts in the field (whose main fault 
is that of not distinguishing between the state sector and the whole economy) 
appear more credible, as an indication of the existence and size of market 
imbalance and the gravity of the problem confronting central planners, than 
the spurious precision of advanced econometrics, which almost tautologically 
defines imbalance out of existence. 
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7. An alternative model 
Let us consider a Soviet-type economy in a state of persistent equili-
brium: consumption markets clear and have cleared without inflation for the 
last ~ years of relevant consumer memory (~ being of the order of magnitude 
of, say five years), at a uniform price level in state and non-state sectors. 
Money (i.e. liquid financial assets) is demanded both to finance current 
transactions and as a component of consumers' portfolio, i.e. 
(1) 
(2) 
Md ~ + MK =M (Y, P, K) 
MS = 0 
where Md consumers' demand for money 
~ consumers' demand for transaction purposes 
MK consumers' demand for money as an asset 
Y = money incomes 
the price level 
the money value of consumers' total assets 
consumers' speculative demand for money. 
Differences between money incomes and current expenditure add to (or 
diminish) the stock of money held by consumers adjusting it to the desired 
level over time. In the position considered here equilibrium has prevailed 
for ~ periods during which 
(3) p - p * 
* * ( 4) M = M (Y., P , K) 
where M is the money in existence and the asterisk indicates equilibrium 
magnitudes in conditions of persistent equilibrium. These are the conditions 
which prevailed, or were approximated, in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
roughly in the second half of the 1950s, after the experience of price stabi-
lity and mild deflation. 
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Next we can imagine the appearance at time t of creeping repressed 
* inflation, i.e. excess demand at prices P t-1 prevailing previously. The 
* but p* > p* • An excess demand appears price level is held at P t-1 t t-1 
and may even grow over time, but the following conditions are fulfilled: 
i) excess demand appears and remains at below a critical fraction of 
current consumption supplies (or, which is the same, the value of excess 
demand is below a critical fraction of MT); thus excess demand grows no 
faster than consumption; ii) no open inflation appears (whether officially 
recorded or unrecorded); iii) shortages are sporadic, not persistently 
concentrated always in the same sectors; they are accompanied by excess 
supply in oth~r sectors and shortages of individual commodities can fall 
as well as increase. Welfare is reduced because of the absolute shortfall 
and because of forced substitution, but the persistent expectation of avai-
lability of goods in the future at constant prices and at a small but posi-
tive real interest rate leads consumers to hold speculatively any surplus 
money over and above desired transaction and asset demand. Within the 
bounds of the three conditions listed here, there is infinitely elastic 
demand for money on the part of consumers for speculative purposes, a kind 
of liquidity "trap" which however in the circumstances of the Soviet-type 
is not at all a "trap" (catching the economy on its way to full employment) 
but rather a shelter protecting it from open inflation. 
(5) MS = M - CMT + MK) subject to conditions i-iii. 
These conditions prevailed, or were approximated, in Eastern Europe in 
the 1960s, and well into the 1970s for the Soviet Union and especially 
the GDR (thanks to its special relation with the FRG which transforms 
structural imbalances into a less intense overall imbalance, preventing 
spillover effects of concentrated shortages). 
The acceleration of the relative weight of shortages, their concen-
tration, or generalised upward trend, lead to open inflation, whether 
hidden or officially recorded. When inflation first appears, or when it 
accelerates, if the price increase is initially calibrated to respond to 
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the scale of the shortfall of consumption with respect to current income 
there will remain residual inflationary pressure because at least some of 
the former MS will be switched towards current purchases. This is why 
higher prices, when decreed after a spell of creeping repressed inflation, 
are either pitched at too low a level with respect to equilibrium in 
current markets or, if prices are pitched at the equilibrium level, they 
will have to be higher than the long-term equilibrium level consistent 
with the given flow of real consumption and of monetary income, in which 
case they are perceived as an unwarrantedly drastic cut in the standard 
of living and strongly resisted. 
Open inflation may and often does lead to the establishment or rapid 
growth of a two-tier market: the state sector where price P1 prevails, and 
price P2 in the second economy where a fraction of the goods originally 
supplied by the state sector are retraded and additional goods are supplied. 
Thus (for each commodity, though here we assume for simplicity that there is 
a homogeneous single consumpti~n good) we have: 
(6) p 
where CK is the consumption supplied by the non-state (kolkhozian and other) 
sector, c81 and c82 are the parts of state-supplied consumption c8 
respecti-
vely consumed directly and retraded in the second economy. Retrading and 
non-state output raise income by the same amount of the value added by these 
activities, i.e. 
Therefore the second economy does not eliminate excess demand by its direct 
contribution (if any) to the reduction of supply shortfalls. It may contri-
bute to the absorption of excess demand through its higher transaction require-
ments of cash per value of turnover; this is likely to be the case but is 
not necessary to the equilibrating role of the second economy. Ultimately, 
excess demand is eliminated by P2 rising high enough to raise the demand for 
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money for transaction purposes and (given time preference, expected free 
prices, and expected state prices times 
at those prices) speculative demand for 
** at prices P2 such that: 
(8) M 
the likelihood of their availability 
money. 
** M 
An equilibrium is reached 
h h h . h equ~l4brium is reached is similar in the The process t roug w J.c • • 
d h S · t t e economy. In a capitalist economy with a full-capitalist an t e ov:Le - YP 
h t b "too much money" in fledged monetary and financial system t ere canno e 
the sense of excess liquid assets in the hands of the public with respect 
, d 1 1 Any excess bonds can be converted into·cash; any to their desire eve • 
excess cash can be spent on goods driving up their price (which reduces the 
excess also indirectly by raising cash requirements for transactions); any 
remaining excess cash can be used to reduce outstanding debt or raise net 
credits vis-a-vis the banking system, any excess cash within the banking 
system can be deposited with the Central Bank; the interest rate and its 
by all these moves, but in this way "excess" structure will be influenced 
liquid assets ultimately will be eliminated and can only appear as a 
temporary phenomenon due to the length and structure of lags irivolved in 
In the Soviet-type economy there are constraints the adjustment process. 
1 1 d t ice rises only outside the affecting this process: price contra s ea o pr 
formal sector, the interest is kept at low levels to prevent the rise of 
rentiers and the existence of two monetary circuits slows down both the 
transmission of shocks and the adjustment process; the two-tier formal and 
and other transaction costs but otherwise informal price system causes queues 
the adjustment process is the same. 
It follows from the temporary and unlikely character of overall 
excess demand, and from the existence of a second economy where state 
goods are retraded and possibly additional goods supplied, that the 
consumer-rationing model a la Barro-H. Grossman is not at all suitable 
for Soviet-type ecor.omies outside the extreme case of distribution 
exclusively through actual ration coupons without retrading, i.e. war 
communism. While Barro-H. Grossman specifically stress their assumption 
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that there is no secondary trading in a two-tier market, and do not claim 
their results to apply outside their model's assumptions, Howard's use of 
that model in spite of his recognition of "the uncontrolled or free consumer 
goods market" (which, moreover, is restricted to the kolkhozian market) is 
illegitimate. The same consideration applies to Partes' theoretical (1979, 
which considers not only current consumption but also expectation of future 
consumption as quantity-rationed) and empirical work (Partes et al. 1977, 
1978, 1980, 1983, 1984), Charemza-Gronicki (1982, 1984) and others. 
Consumers are indeed quantity-rationed in the state sector but they are 
not subject individually to overall quantity constraints since they can 
always spend their money in the secondary market. It follows that the 
"supply-multiplier", i.e. the rounds of reduction in labour supply (and 
therefore consumer goods supply) which are alleged as a consequence of 
quantity constraints, do not necessarily occur and can only be expected 
to be present in the same circumstances in which labour supply would respond 
negatively to open inflation. Moreover, demand functions in the presence of 
persistent and large quantity-rationing must differ from the case of sporadic, 
occasional and small rationing. 
Under-recording of the actual price level faced by consumers (whose 
actual average income is inclusive of second economy value added) is due 
to four possible causes: 
i) P1 being higher than its recorded level; 
ii) P2 being higher than its recorded level; 
iii) the relative weights of CK with respect to CS being under-recorded; 
iv) the neglect of c82 being ultimately purchased by consumers at P2 instead 
of P1 (though, for the purpose of calculating consumers' total purchasing 
power income is also under-recorded unless equation (7) is used to restate 
it). 
In the extensive literature on "hidden" inflation considered above 
(section 5) the first three sources of under-recording are discussed and 
attempts are made for their estimate; while demand for money and the income 
to which demand for money is related should depend on P as defined in equation 
(6) and not on P1c 8 + P2cK as in standard work (Howard, Alton, Askanas-Laski, 
etc.). The same, more comprehensively defined, price level should be used 
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in econometric work a la Portes. Once hidden inflation is properly accounted 
for, any residual excess demand which might be detected must be due to 
adjustment not being instantaneous, because of lags in stock adjustment 
behaviour or to storage capacity constraints (restricting effective demand) 
and similar factors unlikely to be large. Hence it is not surprising to 
find econometric studies estimating it to be small, as in the literature 
surveyed above (in the previous section). Money which, in view of the 
opportunities afforded by the second economy, is voluntarily held by 
consumers is, however involuntarily held insofar as consumers would only too 
willingly unload onto the state sector at state prices their entire cash 
holdings excep1t for M(Y8 + P 2c2 , P 1). Hence the alarmed assessment and 
the admittedly rough estimates of observers who claim there is large imbal-
ance is also correct, and indeed has greater merit if the question is "do 
Soviet-type economies face a large-scale stabilisation task?" instead of 
"are there forced savings?" or "are official authorities lying?". Cumulative 
hidden inflation can be dealt with at a stroke simply by updating official 
price lists and/or recalculating official price indices with the appropriate 
weights; but the quantification of the stabilisation task, the policy 
measures and the alternative paths towards the restoration of market 
clearing at a uniform price and of price stability is much harder both 
to theorise and to implement. 
There are very few. a priori propositions which we can make about the 
size of the task and.the price trends which would restore equilibrium: 
i) the price level which would restore equilibrium is not a single valued 
magnitude but an inverse function of the period over which equilibrium is 
to be restored; 
ii) the range of prices over which this re-equilibrating price would have 
to be pitched, as a function of the period of transition to equilibrium, 
presumably has a maximum level of P2 because, once consumers have to pay 
prices higher than P1 in the state sector, their real income is reduced 
and they could not afford to pay P2 for the rest of their purchases. 
However, an awkward ~omplication is created by the possibility of consumers, 
formerly willing to hold cash balances in the expectation of future 
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purchases at given expected state and free prices, now revise upwards 
their price expectations and unload at least some of their balances into 
the present market, possibly driving the range of re-equilibrating prices 
above the current P2; * 
iii) the re-equilibrating price will be greater than P , i.e. the price 
which would preserve equilibrium if it had been in force for the last ~ 
years; 
iv) the re-equilibrating price being a function of the period of transition 
to equilibrium, it cannot be identified with current P, which is~ weighted 
average of P1 and P2, but not necessarily the average corresponding to the 
selected period of transition. 
These propositions may not provide much assistance for actually 
assessing the gravity of the problem faced by planners, but at the same 
time are strong reasons for rejecting measurements of hidden and repressed 
inflation put forward in the literature reviewed above. Estimates of hidden 
inflation can be rejected because they neglect the weight of secondary 
transactions involving state goods, and because the actual price index 
relative to the official one does not indicate the "true" extent of current 
excess demand, or the "true" price level which if prevailing in the state 
sector would restore equilibrium. Diverging estimates of repressed infla-
tion - whether crude or based on advanced econometric methods - can be 
reconciled in so far as crude pessimistic assessments can be referred to 
policy propositions and optimistic econometric assessments can be referred 
to a much stricter (and policy-irrelevant) definition of the problem; both 
approaches, however, neglect the problem's time dimension (being instanta-
neous measurements) and complexity (i.e. the difference between the equili-
brium level which would preserve equilibrium and the time path of prices 
which would~ it). Both features of the problem have strong policy 
implications. 
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8. Implications for market-clearing and stabilisation 
In market and Soviet-type economies the availability of monetary 
instruments is radically different. In the market economy the measures 
available include: direct controls over bank lending, raising of reserve 
requirements, special (compulsory and unprofitable) deposits to be held 
with the Central Bank by commercial banks, funding of government debt, 
open market operations, raising of the bank rate, etc. In the Soviet-type 
economy some ?f these monetary instruments can be used if the economy has 
1 1 · t t that control and restore planning: got out of planners contra to re1ns a e 
controls over bank lending, interest rate policy for firms. Once the economy 
is back in the g.rip of planners, however, none of these instruments can be 
used. In the household sector the interest rate cannot be raised and net 
issues of government bonds at low interest rates do not find buyers unless 
an element of formal or informal compulsion is introduced in which case they 
become just a form of taxation. In the firms sector, if financial flows 
have already been dovetailed to plans for output, any sale of bonds, 
additional interest rate payment, direct control of credit, would have to be 
matched and therefore neutralised by a government subsidy to firms to enable 
them to fulfill plans. Thus money can be an instrument of monitoring plan 
execution (the "control by the rouble" of Soviet textbooks), not a policy 
instrument. The same applies to taxation in the firms sector. The burden 
of market adjustment will fall on firms under the guise of changes in output 
plans, in which case financial adjustments can be made. 
In the Soviet-type economy, therefore, once money incomes in the state 
sector have been fixed, market stabilisation, understood as the restoration 
of a single market-clearing price will take one or a combination of three 
policies which do not involve monetary means: i) price rises, ii) taxation 
of wealth (not income tax because, if after-tax income could have been 
lowered, money incomes would have been fixed at a lower level); iii) supply 
rises. Both in academic and official circles the discussion of effective 
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stabilisation policies is a search for the equilibrium price level, or the 
once-and-for-all capital levy (mostly in the form of a currency conversion 
at diversified rates, see section 3 above), or the level of the once-and-
for~all or recurring increase in supplies which must take place to stabilise 
the market. The problem, however, is more complex and has a time dimension. 
It is more complex because the price level at which markets would clear 
if they had been clearing for the last~ years of consumers' relevant memory 
will only preserve market equilibrium, if everything else remains unchanged, 
after equilibrium has been reached and maintained for~ years. That price 
level, however, will be too low to ~ equilibrium even given all the 
time in the world. The time dimension is involved not only under the guise 
of~ (a parameter of the formation of consumers' expectations, which is 
influenced not by economic but by political factors, i.e. the credibility 
of governments and of their commitment to market clearing) but as the length 
of the period over which first market clearing is to be achieved, and then 
a transition to equilibrium ratios between assets, income and sales is to be 
implemented. In fact the price level necessary to absorb all excess demand 
will be inversely related to the length of time over which such absorption 
takes place. For instance, if the liquid assets which the population would 
like to convert into goods in the state sector are equal to six months of 
state sales at current prices, it will take a price level twice the current 
level to reach equilibrium in six months, six times the current level to 
reach it in one month, fifty per cent higher to reach it in one year and 
only 10 per cent higher to reach it in three years, with disequilibrium 
persisting at gradually falling levels during the period of transition. 
Once market clearing at a uniform price is reached, consumers having 
exhausted their excess liquid reserves will not be able to maintain their 
real purchases at the going price; the price level will have to fall. After 
~ periods consumers will be persuaded that market clearing will persist and 
they will begin to replenish their liquid assets and reduce their inventories 
of goods towards their long-run equilibrium levels. For markets to clear at a 
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constant rate of supplies and constant money incomes prices will have 
to fall again for a period of time V' equal to the ratio of the difference 
* between equilibrium and current money holdings (M -~+h) to the decrease 
in the market value of the constant supply of goods (per unit of time) 
caused by the price fall. After a time V' has lapsed, consumers will have 
reached their long-term equilibrium holdings of liquid assets M* but further 
cyclical perturbations will follow unless the authorities promptly decree 
a price increase that brings prices to their equilibrium P*. At that point, 
and not before, market clearing is associated with price stability. The 
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after an initial mild price fall, which is desirable in itself to penalise 
speculative hoarding of goods and stabilise expectations, it may be prefer-
able and more expedient to raise incomes instead of lowering prices further, 
in order to allow consumers to replenish their cash holdings. The trouble is 
that the lower prices cannot be maintained after the end of period V+h+V' 
when-consumers have replenished their cash holdings; for the higher income 
level to be maintained, prices would have to undertake a final hike, to the 
* P equilibrium level. This policy variant mixing prices and incomes measures 
is illustrated in figure 2. 
process is illustrated in figure 1. Reliance on a wealth tax or on increased supplies to restore equilibrium 
Planners do not know beforehand the value of h, M** or M* they need 
to know these values in order to complete the process neither later nor 
sooner than they intend, but they do not have to know them to execute a 
stabilisation programme. As long as the planners set a price level at 
which consumers cannot afford to buy up current supplies out of income 
alone, sooner or later they will complete the first stage of market stabili 
sation after a time V corresponding to the price increase and whatever M-M** 
is. If, as is likely, the strictest constraint on the stabilisation prog-
ramme is the rate at which the excess liquid assets can be depleted, i.e. 
the highest state price level the population is prepared to put up with, 
planners' ignorance of M** does not matter at all. They will know that 
the length of time V has been completed when they experience a generalised 
rise in inventory levels. At that point they can let prices find their own 
level; they will know the second stage of stabilisation is completed and the 
h-th period has arrived after V when at those prices they will see a further 
generalised rise in inventories. Again they can let prices find their own 
level but after a while they will experience lower than normal inventories. 
The authorities will know from this sign that they have just overshot the end 
of the further V' periods. They will have to raise prices but if they let 
the market find its level a dampened fluctuation around the long-run equili-
brium level of liquid assets and prices will follow; this might be preferable 
to attempts at guessing what the equilibrium level is, which might cause 
disturbances worse than dampened fluctuations. At the end of the V periods 
can now be easily illustrated by highlighting the differences with respect 
to the previous case during the three stages of stabilisation, of lengths 
V, hand V'. A conversion of the currency confiscating the excess part of 
real value of liquid assets would shorten period V to zero. Beside the 
advantage of speeding up the stabilisation process, the conversion has other 
enormous advantages: it can confiscate purchasing power at progressive rates; 
it confiscates totally those liquid assets which originated from illegal 
profits to the extent that they cannot be laundered; even if a constant 
(i.e. non-progressive) part of liquid assets are confiscated, the measure 
is not regressive, as a generalised price increase which forces greater cons-
umption cuts on people who do not hold liquid assets would be. The only disad-
vantage of a confiscatory currency conversion is that it takes longer to print 
the new currency and execute the manoeuvre than to decree higher prices; there 
is a greater chance of a leak, in which case all liquid assets would become 
instantaneously "surplus" in the whole economy (including the non-state 
sector): serious market disruptions and social disturbances might be set 
in motion unless the manoeuvre is swiftly and efficiently executed. Also, 
there may be - without real justification - greater odium for the government 
in a single large-scale confiscatory move than in an equally confiscatory 
price rise diluted over a period of time V. If the conversion is pitched 
at the "right" rate, equivalent to M**/M units of the new currency for one 
old, market-clearing will be instantaneously reached and from that point 
onwards the story will continue as in the previous case: prices will fall 
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for h periods, fall further for another V' periods, after which equilibrium 
can be attained (see figure 3), or approached through dampened fluctuations 
(or incomes may undertake compensatory inverse changes, as in the previous 
case). The period of mild open deflation experienced by the Soviet Union 
and other East European countries after the currency conversions at the turn 
of the 1950s (see above, section 3 and Table 2) can well be attributed to 
the necessary overshooting implicit in achieving market-clearing, whether 
instantly or through a period of confiscatory inflation. The experience of 
those conversions suggests that the conversion had been pitched at rates which 
were either correct or slightly lower (i.e. more confiscatory) than necessary. 
If the conversion is not pitched at the appropriate rate, because planners do 
not know the value of M*, other instruments (prices, incomes, income taxes or 
supply changes) will have to be used, rather than making further clumsy 
attempts at currency reform. 
If stabilisation were to be achieved through changes in supplies the 
corresponding path is the parallel of stabilisation through price changes. 
Namely, incomes and prices remain unchanged while supplies must rise over 
and above what consumers can afford at current prices out of income, for 
a length of time V inversely related to the improvement in supplies, until 
** liquid assets reach M At that point, signalled by inventories rising 
above normal levels, supply could fall below the previous level for h 
periods, fall further ~or V' periods and then be pitched at the long-run 
* equilibrium level exactly when consumers reach asset holdings M • 
The path is illustrated in figure 4. 
An infinite number of alternative paths can be generated by mixing in 
different proportions the three policy alternatives. The best course would 
be the following: i) smooth the course of real consumption, switching 
resources from accumulation to consumption if this can be done without 
reducing growth - as it probably can if the structure of investment is 
more efficiently planned and executed - or at any rate without a growth 
cost greater than the value put on market stabilisation; ii) maintain the 
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existing level of money incomes, or if necessary raise them at any time 
as little as possible consistently with the maintenance of social peace 
(or at least of law and order without extreme measures); iii) execute a 
currency reform aimed at instantly obtaining market clearing at a uniform 
price level within and outside the state sector; iv) aim at the maintenance 
of the·price level during the h periods of the second stage of stabilisation, 
lowering income tax rather than raising incomes or lowering prices (if social 
pressure imposes higher incomes than required by the manoeuvre, then maintain 
the increase as low as possible and allow prices to increase so as to 
preserve market-clearing); v) continue with this kind of policy during the V' 
periods of the third stage of stabilisation; vi) raise income tax and if 
necessary hike the price level once and for all at the end of the period, 
to make current incomes and liquid assets consistent with the consumption 
flow. Others might prefer other courses; the choice is political, but one 
thing is sure: the path to market-clearing and to stabilisation is more 
complex than the simplistic pitching of an equilibrium price level as usually 
suggested in discussions about repressed inflation and in policy documents. 
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9. The cost of hidden and repressed inflation 
If overall excess demand in a two-tier Soviet-type economy is supposed 
to be small, in the limited sense that a sudden and extensive "flight out 
of money" with hyperinflationary consequences is highly unlikely, the 
question might be asked whether hidden and repressed inflation have a cost 
for the economy which is high enough to warrant the effort of reaching and 
maintaining market clearing and stabilising prices. 
Hidden inflation has a distorting informational effect, if people 
11 b 1 . off1"c1"al indices, but since consumer choice will be guided actua y e l~~e 
by actual prices the unreliability of official indices is likely to have 
little effect (except perhaps in wage negotiations). Excess demand at 
state prices, however, through queueing, informal exchanges and a two-tier 
h "d bl costs Queueing time is a direct and price system, does ave cons1 era e • 
sizeable loss of leisure; it is also a transaction cost which, together with 
the other additional costs of the two-tier market (which often has three or 
many more tiers, neglected here for simplicity) reduce consumer welfare. 
There are illegal and immoral implications of two-tier markets and the non-
state production sector (pilfering to supply inputs in the non-state sector, 
etc.). Short of actually rationing supplies with coupons, distribution of 
real consumption acquires an element of chance which cannot be reduced by 
fiscal mesures; it is as if money consisted of lottery tickets, a system 
which nobody has ever sponsored. Speculative stockpiling by consumers 
instead of shops can be wasteful. The persistence of a sellers' market 
depresses quality of goods and keeps producers out of touch with consumers' 
wishes, leading to unnecessary inefficiency; persistent excess demand is 
the main obstacle to the introduction and to the effectiveness of economic 
reforms, which is a considerable cost in itself. It is doubtful - or at 
any rate controversial - whether inflation has a real cost in a capitalist 
market-economy; apart from adverse distributional effects (which can be 
mitigated or eliminated by compensatory payments to the needier and weaker 
sections of society) the only tangible drawback being the restriction that 
inflation. poses on the scope of division of labour and therefore welfare. 
- 43 -
These costs of open inflation are bound to be even smaller in a Soviet-type 
economy, where redistribution measures can be taken even more ·swiftly than 
in a market economy, and the degree of "division of labour" can be planned 
regardless of inflation. Open inflation, therefore, is undoubtedly a better 
alternative than persistent excess demand. 
It may or may not be the case that an environment of generalised 
abundance will make it possible to reduce the scope of markets (of "commo-
dity production" in Marxian parlance) without adverse effects on labour 
supply, moral hazards, etc., but it is absurd to pretend that abundance 
has been achieved already when it has not. As long as markets are used for 
the distribution of at least some consumption goods, there can be no doubt 
that the restoration of equilibrium in those markets at a single price is a 
desirable, indeed essential task for the socialist planner. Markets m~y be 
rightly distrusted in their role in investment allocation, and even in the 
allocation of current resources (for the neglect of externalities, inability 
to deal competitively with increasing returns, etc.), but remain unrivalled 
systems of distributing whatever amounts and kinds of consumption goods and 
services a socialist economy of the Soviet-type makes available to its 
citizens, apart from public goods (and possibly saturated needs). There is 
nothing "socialist" or even "marxist-leninist" about excess demand. There 
is nothing in the original design or in the philosophy of socialism that 
justifies the distribution of consumption goods and services to the popu-
lation through the inefficient, unfair and degrading mechanisms of queueing, 
informal exchanges and barter. Marx had incited his followers to change the 
world, not to pretend that they had changed it: if socialism, through a combi-
nation of bad luck and ill judgement, has failed to deliver price stability 
it is better to recognise it than to ignore this failure or treat it as 
a passing temporary self-regulating minor phenomenon. The persistence of 
excess demand, indeed the elevation of shortage to a systemic feature, leads 
to a prima facie case for suspecting that it is maintained primarily because 
it conceals the privileges of the elite through exclusive access to luxuries 
and necessiti~s at abnormally low prices, while market-clearing prices would 
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reveal and quantify privilege, as its maintenance would require drastically 
more unequal incomes and wealth. 
10. Summary and conclusions 
In a centrally planned economy of the Soviet-type, inflationary 
pressures may arise due to planning error, unfavourable exogenous factors 
and downward inflexibility of money wages (section 2). These pressures do 
not always take the form of open official inflation (section 3) in view of 
systemic comm~tment to the maintenance of price stability; in this case 
inflationary pressures take the form of hidden and/or repressed inflation. 
Hidden inflation is a differential between official (state and non-
state) price indices and the actual cost of living to consumers; it arises 
from understatement of actual prices (in the state and non-state sectors) 
and/or of the relative weight of the more inflationary goods or sectors. 
Repressed inflation is rising excess demand for goods and services at the 
actual prices in the state and non-state sectors, i.e. rising excess 
liquid balances in the hands of the population (often the very existence 
of excess demand is defined as "repressed inflation"; see section 4). 
Estimates of hidd~n inflation in the recent literature (reviewed in 
section 5) are based on direct recomputation of indices, the calculation 
of implicit deflators and international comparisons of purchasing power 
parities. These estimates neglect the impact on the price level of the 
retrading of goods originally supplied in the state sector and other 
production and distribution activities outside the state sector (except 
the collective farm market), i.e. they understate the price differential 
in the controlled and uncontrolled (legal and illegal) market. Also the 
actual price level, being an average of prices in a two-tier system, cannot 
be identified with an "equilibrium" level. 
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Excess demand and its rate of change (i.e. the rate of repressed 
inflation) are the object of wildly diverging estimates (section 6). 
These range from alarmed outcries of impending financial catastrophe, 
based on the visible growth of financial (cash and non-cash) assets with 
respect to income and expenditure, to cool dismissive counterclaims that 
excess demand is negligible, based on the observation of uncontrolled 
transactions in the second economy and on econometric testing and quanti-
fication. Econometric models based on quantity-rationing consumer behaviour 
models seem inappropriate in view of uncontrolled-price transactions where 
individual consumers are not rationed, and therefore the postulated adverse 
feedback on labour supply is not necessarily present. By and large excess 
money holdings in the economy as a whole (i.e. with reference to the two-tier 
market) can be deemed to be small regardless of reliance on econometric 
evidence, except for the presence of lags and other minor factors which might 
slow down the adjustment of money balances to the actual two-tier price level. 
However, the small size or even absence of excess money holdings (and therefore 
of repressed inflation) is consistent with large-scale imbalance in the state 
sector, since consumers who - given the two-tier mar~et - voluntarily hold 
liquid assets, do not refrain voluntarily from converting most or all of 
them into goods in state shops where they are quantity-rationed. 
A simple model has been presented illustrating the complexity and time 
profile of the problem under discussion, due to the difference between 
the price level which would preserve equilibrium if it had been prevailing 
for a sufficiently long period, and the price levels (depending on the speed 
of adjustment) and their time paths which can ~ market clearing at 
single prices starting from a two-tier market in a state of imbalance 
(section 7). The model has been used to analyse states of persistent 
equilibrium, creeping repressed inflation (i.e. excess demand growth being 
tolerated because it remains diffused, fluctuating and not exceeding a 
critical average threshold), hidden inflation (as defined above in this 
section) and excess demand/repressed inflation which, when referred 
to the state sector, is large and endemic in Soviet-type economies. 
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Alternative stabilisation paths and their combinations have been 
investigated, using as policy instruments the price level, a liquid wealth 
tax (or currency conversion) and supply improvements (section 8). All paths 
have three stages: transition to market clearing at a single price (instantly 
reached only with a currency conversion at the "right" rate) which implies 
overshooting with respect to long-run equilibrium, restoration of market-
clearing habits on the part of disillusioned consumers, and eventually the 
replenishing of liquid asset holdings by reassured consumers. 
Finally, the costs of hidden inflation and above all of excess demand 
(and repressed inflation) in the state sector, and the two-tier market 
associated with excess demand at state prices, are discussed (transaction 
costs, misa1.locations and hindrance of economic reform, random distributive 
effects, etc., see section 9) and are found to be greater than the cost (if 
any) of open inflation. In sum, the task of stabilisation in Soviet-type 
economies is seen as large-scale, time-consuming and complex, and its 
implementation imperative. 
***** 
Table 1: Prices and nominal wages in the USSR, 1928-1947 
Period 
1928-1947 
of which: 
1928-1937 
1938-1940 
1941-1947 
Retail prices 
in state and cooperative shops Wholesale 
prices of 
official J.G. Chapman F.D. Holzman basic in-
dustrial 
goods 
Average annual increments in per cent 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
17.2 16.2-17 .41) 21.3 5.6 
20.5 22.5-26.3 24.0 12.2 
5.9 8.0- 9.71) 13.0 6.5 
18.1 11.5-12.3 21.4 0.8 
Average 
nominal 
wages 
(5) 
12.8 
17.6 
10.3 
8.0 
Note: 1) J.G. Chapman's data refer to 1948 instead of 1947; they do not 
comprise, therefore, the peak price level of 1947. 
Sources: Average annual increments in per cent were computed from the 
following data: 
Col. (1): Chapman (1963), p. 157 for 1928-1940; 
Malafeyev (1964), p. 258 for 1940-1947; 
Col. (2): Chapman (1963), pp. 81 and 87 for "all commodities"; 
her two sets of indices in col. (2) reflect different 
weights, 1928 and 1937 respectively. 
Col. (3), (4), (5): Holzman (1960), pp. 168 and 169; for 1940 his 
January retail price index - and not that of July - was 
employed. 
From: Pindak (1983), pp. 5-6. 
Table 2: Retail prices and nominal wages in USSR and Eastern Europe, 
1948-1980. 
Notes: 
USSR GDR Cze Pol Hun Bul Rum 1) Gross nominal wages in the socialist sector, unless otherwise stated. 
2) Instead of the non-available average nominal wage in 1947, A. Nave's 
average annual rates in per cent estimate - 550 rubles - was used. 
+ increase I - decrease 3) Aver~ge rate of 1955 and 1956. 
4) Wages in non-agricultural sector. 
5) Net wages. 
1. Deflationary 1948 1951 1954 1954 1954 6) Average rate for 1958-1968. 
period: -1957 -1960 -1961 -1961 -1956 
Sources: 
retail 
prices -8.2 -6.0 -3.5 -3.9 -1.0 Computed from official data of national statistical yearbooks, various 
- nominal!) 
+3.32) +6. 73) 
issues; International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various 
wages +2.9 +3.1 +7.2 issues, and In~ernational Labour Office, Supplement 1981, April 1981. 
2. Period of From: Pindak (1983), p. 10. 
"retail :erice 1958 1961 1962 1957 1957 1958 1961 
stabilit:y:'': -1976 -1978 -1973 -1972 -1968 -1972 -1972 
retail 
prices 0.0 -0.2 1.0 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 
- nominal!) 2.74,6) wages 3.6 3.2 4.0 5.2 5.4 
3. Period of 
o:een in- 1977 1979 1974 1973 1969 1973 1973 
flation: -1979 -1980 -1979 -1980 -1979 -1979 
retail 
prices 0.7 0.2 1.7 5.3 4.1 1.1 1.0 
- nominal!) 
wages 2·.6 3.0 2.9 10.75) 4.84) 4.54) 5.04) 
of which: 
retail prices 
in 1979 1.1 0.2 3.8 7.1 8.9 4.6 2.0 
in 1980 3.4 10.9 
- nominal 1) 
wages: 4) 4) 4.84) in 1979 2.2 3.0 2.5 8.84) 5.84) 5.5 
in 1980 2.4 13.5 2.6 
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Table 4: Reward's estimated and official indices for prices and sales, USSR 1955-72. 
Real Sales Index on State and 
Year State Retail Price Index General Consumer Price Index Cooperative Retail Market 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Official Estimate Estimate Official Estimate Estimate Official Estimate Estimate 
1955 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1956 100.0 101.9 102.5 98.8 100.9 101.5 108.7 106.4 107.0 
1957 100.0 104.8 108.7 98.4 103.3 106.9 124.0 114.6 118.8 
1958 102.2 106.7 107.8 101.0 105.4 106.4 131.7 125.2 126.4 
1959 101.4 106.1 107.3 100.1 104.7 105.8 142.3 133,5 135.1 
1960 100.7 106.0 108.0 99.6 104.7 106.5 156.7 144.9 147.6 
1961 100.0 104.5 105.7 99.7 103.7 104.8 162.5 152.8 154.6 
1962 101.4 107.2 108.0 101.7 106.8 107.5 172.6 161.0 162.2 
1963 102.2 108.7 108.9 102.9 108.6 108.8 180.8 167.7 168.0 
1964 102.2 108.3 108.9 103.3 108.5 109.0 190.4 176.3 177.3 
1965 101.4 109.6 111.6 101.6 108.9 110.8 209.1 187.0 190.4 
1966 100.7 108.7 110.4 100.4 107.7 109.3 227.4 203.9 207.1 
1967 100.7 109.5 112.2 100.4 108.4 110.9 248.6 219.4 224.8 
1968 100.7 110.1 113.5 100.5 109.1 112.2 269.2 235.5 242.8 
1969 100.7 111.3 115.3 101.4 110.9 114.5 288.9 249.5 258.5 
1970 100.7 112.3 117.3 102.0 112.2 116.7 310.6 263.6 275.3 
1971 100.7 114.1 120.5 101.4 113.4 119.3 331.7 273.8 289.1 
1972 100.7 115.1 122.6 102.1 114.8 121.7 354.3 286.7 305.4 
From: Howard (1976), p. 607. 
Table 5: East European alternative consumer prices indices (Alton et al.) 
Price indices Average annual change 
1970=100 (per cent) 
1975 1978 1971-75 1976-78 1978 
Bulgaria: 1 Official: state retail1trade 100.9 3 
102.8 0.2 4 0.5 
1.2 
Official: coop. market 123.6 137.6 4.3 5.5 (2) 
Alternative 116.0 129.1 3.0 3.2 2.5 
Czechoslovakia: 1 Official: consumer ret. prices 100.7 103.6 0.1 0.9 0.9 
Alternative 111.4 116.2 2.2 1.6 1.8 
German Democratic ReEublic: 1 Official: consumer ret. prices 98.4 98.2 -0.3 0 0 
Alternative 103.3 108.6 0.7 1.3 0.6 
Hungary: 1 Official: consumer prices 114.5 130.8 2.9 4.3 4.6 
Alternative 122.4 139.8 4.1 4.4 4.5 
Poland: 1 134.1 2.5 5.9 8.1 Official: consumer ret. prices 113.3 
Alternative 131.8 168.5 5.7 8.0 8.9 
Rumania: 
Official: commodity prices and 
service tariffs 102.6 105.4 0.5 o. 7 1.5 
Alternative (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
1: The official price indices are described in detail in Alton (see source) 
2: Not available 
3: 1977 
4: 1976-77. 
Source: Alton et al. (1979) 
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Table 8: Pindak's income velocity of household financial assets, 1955-79 
(for Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and the USSR) "'0 \0 ~ c: 044 1-10 0:. 0.--1 ttiOO C'1 0 00 00 00 
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\0 0 \0 Ql ttl QIO\ ...... C'1 0\ N ~ 0\ 0 \0 0 \0 tf.l,.C: ?-,..-< \0 
" " 
..... 
" 
1.1"\N 
Year Ratio between income Ratio between income and 
"; 00 and household cash household non-cash financial 0 " N 0\ 00 N 0 0\ 0\ 0\ 1.1"\ 0\ \0 01.0 
assets ~ ..... N ...... C'1 0 C'1 0 \0 01.0 ..... ...... ..... 1.1"\ ..... 
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1.1"\N 
...... 
0 0\ 
CZE GDR HUN POL CZE GDR HUN POL USSR 0\ N 1.1"\ " 0:. 
" 
..... 0 
" " 
0 
" 
1.1"\ 
""" ...... 0\ ..... ...... ...... N ...... 0\ ~ " \0 ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... C'1 1.0 """N 1955 7.4 4.7 10.7 15.0 8.5 83.1 10.1 ...... 
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Table 10: Holzman's indicator of repressed inflation for the USSR, 
1955-1979 (1955=100) 
Year Indicator Year Indicator 
1956 59 1964 39 
1957 40 1965 28 
1958 41 1966 24 
1959 32 1967 24 
1960 30 1968 22 
1961 38 1969 25 
1962 37 1970 22 
1963 36 1971 22 
Sources: Holzman (1960); Garvy (1977); Dirkens 
Table 11: Kornai's macro-index of shortage 
(based on Hungarian data, 1965-78). 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
(1981). 
Year Index based on 14-year 
time-series 
Index based on 9-year 
time-series 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
0.412 
0.430 
0.429 
0.544 
0.600· 
0.548 
0.498 
0.400 
0.401 
0.456 
0.508 
0.505 
0.553 
0.496 
From: Kornai (1982). 
0.548 
0.486 
0.404 
0.401 
0.447 
0.496 
0.503 
0.531 
0.479 
Indicator 
23 
25 
23 
27 
30 
30 
34 
34 
Table 12: Average Simulated Excess Demands (per cent), 
Poland 1957-1980 (Portes et al.). 
Model I Model Ila Model Ill Model Vb 
---
1957 3.0 3.7 0.7 -3.6 
1958 -4.1 -1.8 -2.5 -3.9 
1959 0.8 0.7 -0.8 1.0 
1960 -6.8 -5.5 -5.2 -4.4 
1961 5.1 2.2 1.7 1.4 
1962 -4.1 -3.1 -2.8 -2.0 
1963 -0.3 -1.5 -0.8 -0.6 
1964 -4.2 -2.5 -3.1 -1.6 
1965 -1.1 -0.8 -1.0 1.8 
1966 -3.5 -2.0 -3.0 1.0 
1967 -3.0 -1.1 -2.1 -0.7 
1968 0.4 1.8 0.5 2.5 
1969 -0.9 1.6 -0.8 0.2 
1970 -0.2 0.9 0.1 -1.0 
1971 4.5 3.8 2.2 2.5 
1972 0.7 5.0 0.9 7.0 
1973 -3.0 1.8 -2.3 2.7 
1974 -0.9 .3.6 -0.3 1.2 
1975 1.0 2.2 -0.4 2.8 
1976 -1.0 -0.8 -2.4 -2.9 
1977 -1.5 -1.3 -2.6 -0.1 
1978 -10.7 -7.1 -7.2 -8.7 
1979 1.5 0.4 0.4 1.2 
1980 1.2 -0.1 0.5 1.2 
From: Portes et al. (1983). 
Table 13: Charemza-Gronicki's estimates for absolute and percentage 
excess demand for consumption and labour 
Table 14: Charemza-Gronicki's balancing and observed price indices 
for consumption goods, Poland 1960-80. 
Absolute estimates in % of quantity transacted 
Year PB P6o PB - p60 Consumption labour in consumption labour 
Year in bil. zl. ml. of 
employees 1960=100.0 
1960 106.2 100.0 6.2 
1960 15.1 0.373 6.20 3.01 1961 107.6 100.9 6.7 
1961 16.6 0.351 6.29 2.79 1962 109.4 103.5 5.9 
1962 16.1 0.532 5.74 4.15 1963 108.9 104.3 4.6 
1963 13.2 0.234 4.43 1. 79 1964 lll.1 106.0 5.1 
1964 15.2 0.309 4.82 2.35 1965 113.0 107.6 5.4 
1965 17.2 0.140 5.04 1.03 1966 ll4.6 108.6 6.0 
1966 20.3 0.089 5.53 0.64 1967 ll6.0 ll0.4 5.6 
1967 20.2 0.365 5.07 2.54 1968 ll7 .4 112.3 5.1 
1968 19.6 0.265 4.51 1.80 1969 118.0 114.0 4.0 
1969 16.2 0.428 3.54 2.84 1970 118.8 ll5.5 3.3 
1970 13.9 0.269 2.84 1. 77 1971 123.4 116.6 6.8 
1971 30.8 0.039 5.81 0.25 1972 126.2 116.8 9.4 
1972 48.4 0.261 8.08 1.65 1973 131.7 120.5 11.2 
1973 62.8 0.971 9.30 6.01 1974 141.6 128.3 13.3 
1974 79.7 0.919 10.34 5.58 1975 144.2 132.0 12.4 
1975 81.4 1.273 9.27 7.68 1976 151.3 139.5 11.8 
1976 86.0 1.313 8.48 7.93 1977 158.2 146.9 11.3 
1977 87.6 0.826 7.72 5.00 1978 169.0 158.7 10.3 
1978 80.4 1.169 6.51 7.03 1979 180.8 169.3 11:.5 
1979 92.1 1.985 6.81 12.00 1980 200.6 186.2 14.4 
1980 117.7 2.133 7.74 12.93 
From: Charemza-Gronicki (1984), table 5, p. 91. 
From: Charemza-Gronicki (1984), table 2, p. 82. 
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FOOTNOTES 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Net of government debt redemptions and increases in bank·lending to 
the public; private loans however are modest and do not give banks 
tangible opportunities of coping with inflationary pressure by means 
of a credit squeeze. 
In the Soviet Union in 1947 all roubles in circulation were withdrawn 
and replaced with new roubles at a 10 to 1 ratio, while for bank 
savings and state bonds the conversion ratio was more favourable. 
On the day after the reform workers were paid their two-weekly wage 
in new roubles, at a one to one ratio (see Holzman, 1955, p. 232 
et seq.). 
In 1952 in Romania prices, wages and state funds were converted at 
the rate 100 to 5; cash at a progressive rate ranging between 100 
to 1 and lOO to 0.25, savings at progressive rates ranging between 
100 to 2 and 100 to 0.50. In Bulgaria in the same year the conversion 
rate was 100 to 4 for prices, wages and state funds, 100 to 1 for 
cash, while savings were converted at progressive rates ranging 
between 100 to 3 and 100 to 1. · 
Nave's guess-estimate of Polish hidden inflation at 8 per cent in 
1975 (Nove, 1979) is rejected by Partes because, given official 
estimates of nominal incomes and consumption price index, would 
imply "that real incomes actually fell that year!" (Partes, 1984). 
Yet if, say, half the hidden inflation was due to transactions in 
private and secondary markets, nominal incomes would also be higher, 
by 4 per cent, and Nave's assertion - though unsupported - would 
at any rate be perfectly plausible. 
"Do you often have queues as long as these?". "No, not very often. 
Only when there are goods in the shops" (Polish humour). 
Often simply moving few people from the queue to behind the counter 
would eliminate queues and save time all round. Turcan (1977) 
suggests that in Poland in the mid-1970s queues were due to "organi-
sational and human" factors" more than to shortages (p. 136). Under-
provision of distributive service is of course by definition excess 
demand but only for the services, not the goods; a small excess demand 
for distributive services may appear as large excess demand for goods, 
because these goods must be jointly purchased together with the distri-
butive service associated with their sale. 
Comparing Polish with Italian and Irish data Podkaminer estimates 
excess demand for commodity groups and the price changes necessary 
to eliminate them in Poland in the period 1965-78. He claims that 
food demand would have been consistently lower than supply bad it not 
been for spillover demand (forced substitution) due to excessively 
low prices in the "rent" and "rest" commodities. To eliminate 
imbalance. food prices should have been ~ by 15%, provided 
8. 
9. 
that other Low-price goods were made correspondingly dearer 
(Podkaminer, 1983, p. 179). 
As in the analogous relationship between the recorded and unrecoraed 
components of open._ inflation,.· see p •• H above. ' Dirks en contends that 
the validity of Holz.man 1 s indicator. rests {)n .state _prices having. a 
zero rate of open inflation (1981, p. 307, footnote 1);, this is 
unjustified and would violate the multiplicative relation required 
by consistent accounting. 
From the data reproduced in Table 13 Charemza-Gronicki calculate an 
index of "degree of. repressed_ inflation~' (RID) defined as the difference 
between the excess demand index evaluated in constant 1960 prices and 
the price index for particular years (Charemza-Gronicki, 1984, p. 88). 
The RID index has the drawbacks of comparing indices (of ex~ess 
demand and of prices) not weighted by their respective volumes of 
transactions-, of not possessing the multiplicative properties of price 
indices (differences between indices being . .very rough-approximations 
to the trend. of·· their ratios for the large rel<;~.tive changes recorded) 
and ofmeasuring·changes·in-excess _demand with respect to·the base 
year and not its degree~ The Charemza-:Gronicki index of the ''degree 
of repressed inflation" (1984, Table 4) is therefore meaningless. 
10. As in the RID index, mentioned in the previous footnote, differences 
between indices_ only approximate. trends in the ratios between._ them; 
even accepting the proposed approach· the appropriate measure of ~·the 
proportional excess of pB,over p6 is (pB/p60 - 1) and_not{pB-:- P60), 
which h~re systematically over-es~imates excess demand., .Whetl' properly 
calculated.excess·demand·still peaks in 1974 at Hl.4 per cent, later 
falls to6.5 per cent in 1978 and, rises C1gain.tq .. 7.7 per~cent in 1980. 
Cumulative rates gf repressed inflation can be calc~lated,as the growth 
rates of these excess demand indices •. 
11. ''With_ tl:J,e existence of. an. exte11ded . secqnd_ economy, postulated generally 
for the CPEs ofEastern Europe, growing cashand.savings bank deposits 
do not indicate forced'saving, but only show that private households 
;:u;e unwilli!lg to P13.Y the. higher prices on the different types of 
markets outside·thepublic sector,_to pay bribes, or to incur other 
forms of transaction_-~osts-~. -·They pr~fer liquid assets •. : Likewi.se 
- queueing does n9t indicate tha,t people carmqt buy what they w:ish and 
,therefore cannot spend- .the:i.r money, as is often arg!led. .Q\leueing only 
:·,shows that private hou~eholds evalu13.1:e the disutilities of gue).le;i.ng 
less than_;!:he. disutilities .arie;;i.ng f:r:om higher price~:;_in :the• second 
economyor from paying,bribes. Every economic,unit can:ehoose:tO spend 
its money outside the pubJ_i(! S~c:tor and obta;i.n goqdS_IllOre_rctpidly, but 
at higher costs, or to wait for a favourable occasion. The respective 
behaviour is dete,pn:i;ned,, py, :vari0\113. expe,ctatim;ts. ;If.oweve:r; ,. the .decision 
tq accumu],13.te _llloney· and ·• near:-J.iloney under;: the~e .. circumstances j.s -volun-
t:a~y" -(Hartwig, 1983,. p. ·104). · 
12. repressed inflation (excess demand in our terminology) in the 
state goods market persists even when the collective farm market 
clears" (Gardner-Strauss, 1981, pp. 392-393). These authors, however, 
infer from this the existence of excess (involuntary) money balances 
in the economy as a whole, which as we have seen is not necessarily 
the case. See also Wimberley, 1981, on the 'involuntary' nature of 
m?st transactions in the second economy. 
13. In the summer of 1985 water authorities facing drought in Florence 
have not rationed water in spite of water reserves gradually falling 
to zero because they expected the introduction of rationing would 
raise current demand over the normal level through consumers building 
up their own reserves, filling up their bath tubs and therefore 
demanding more water than usual at the same price. In the same way, 
once supply of any good falls substantially below equilibrium at the 
going price, consumers will demand at that price more than the normal 
equilibrium level, lowering their liquid asset holdings below the 
normal equilibrium level. 
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